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Introduction
The title of this Article might well be "Information Property
Compounded by the Internet." I believe that the rapid adoption of the
World Wide Web and other uses of the Internet may act to accelerate
and compound an existing trend toward the commoditization of
certain types of information as property. I also believe that the
presumed benefits of this trend-a greater production of
information-may well be outweighed by the costs-reduced access to
information.
I will not take much time arguing that use of the Internet,
principally e-mail and the World Wide Web, is exploding. Whether the
figures are 20 million users or 40 million users seems less important
than the fact that the Internet is now part of our daily lives. We all
have our stories of the Internet as an integral part of our culture; mine
mostly involve my mother-in-law.
The trend toward commoditization (by which I mean the creation
or expansion of a property right) takes a little bit more explanation.
Many commentators have seen it developing recently in two principal
areas. First is the rapidly expanding law of "misappropriation." Some
have called this the "misappropriation explosion."' Essentially this
refers to a line of cases where courts have found a state law property
right in information that is independent from the rights found under
federal copyright, patent, and trademark laws.2 The second area is a
series of efforts, principally by the Clinton Administration, to expand
the scope of intellectual property rights under various existing and
proposed federal statutes in some surprising ways. 3 I call this second
area the "oxymoron explosion," for reasons I will describe later. Both
1. Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Propertyand the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV.149, 150 (1992).
2. See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)
(holding Florida statute prohibiting "direct molding" of boat hulls preempted by federal patent
law; however, state regulations regarding potentially patentable but unpatented subject matter
are not ipso facto preempted by federal patent laws); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986
(1984)(holding research data submitted to federal agency considered "property" within meaning
of fifth amendment to the extent the data was cognizable as a trade secret); International News
Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996)(holding shrinkwrap license agreement valid under contract law theory, even though
underlying data not protected by copyright); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26-27
(1987)(holding reporter's knowledge of the contents of the prepublication and publication
schedule of his newspaper column properly considered "property" of the newspaper's publisher).
3. For a discussion of these efforts, see infra Part II.A.
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of these trends existed before the Internet became an important
means of communication. I think the Internet has accelerated the pace
of their development. I hope that if we reflect on the implications of
these legal structures we will all proceed a bit more carefully.
I
The Misappropriation Explosion
Before going over a number of cases illustrating the trend towards
treating information as property, I want to discuss briefly the reasons
information generally has not been regarded as property. First, it is
hard to recognize a property right in information, because although it
is embodied (examples include phone books, diskettes, and sports
pager memories), it generally does not have an embodiment. What
does a creditor foreclose on? Some say "information wants to be
free,"4 or information is "inherently leaky."5 The point is that many
people can share information at the same time without diminishing its
value. This is used as an argument to commoditize information, on the
"public goods" theory that this characteristic will result in the
underproduction of information unless the high costs of production
are compensated by the grant of a property interest to producers. 6
Finally, although information content is becoming an increasing
percentage of the value added in many products in our society, and
our copyright-based industries are constantly launching attacks on the
"pirates" that reduce their ability to exploit that content, our society is
very unused to treating information as property and subject to the
exclusionary implications of a property regime.7 The traditions of our

4. See Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property:Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal
a ChangingDirection in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 365, 365 (1989)(citing
Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News
Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. Cm. L. REv.411, 411 (1983)("That information once published
should be presumptively free for all to use is a commonplace of intellectual property law.")).
5. Samuelson, supranote 4, at 369.
6. Because public goods such as information can be used by numerous people without
diminishing the supply, it can be difficult for a producer of such goods to recoup the costs of
production. Therefore the public goods theory states that people will not produce public goods

absent strong incentives, such as intellectual property protection. For a discussion of the
public goods theory, see, for example, Paul David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the
Panda's Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RiGrrs IN Sci. & TECH.19, 25-28 (Mitchel B.
Wallerstein, et al. eds., 1993).
7. Samuelson, supranote 4, at 369.
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country are that free and unfettered access to information is the best
means of increasing wealth and stimulating invention.
A. InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press
The beginning of the misappropriation explosion is found in the
1918 case of International News Service v. Associated Press.'
Associated Press (AP) operated a news gathering service. An
international network of correspondents and wire services provided
news which was printed in AP newspapers.9 International News
Service (INS) made a practice of free-riding on AP's efforts. INS
employees would gather news from AP's notice boards and from early
editions of the AP east coast newspapers, taking advantage of the time
difference by using the gathered information in western cities.10 AP
sued, claiming unfair competitionPn AP's case was the "public goods"
argument, that without a legally protected interest in the news it
gathered, AP would not make the investment required to provide the
service.' The Supreme Court held for AP, creating a property interest
in freedom from unfair competition in news gathering. 13
Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented.'4 Justice Holmes
reasoned that "when an uncopyrighted combination of words is
published there is no general right to forbid other people repeating
them."'- Holmes would have found liability on a misrepresentation
theory, rather than through the creation of a property right, noting
that "a person is not excluded from using any combination of words
merely because someone has used it before, even if it took labor and
genius to make it."' 6 Justice Brandeis was more blunt, saying that "the
fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money and labor,
and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to
ensure to it this legal attribute of property."' 7
Newspaper publishers liked this case in 1918. They like it today. It
was cited to me recently as the basis for a claim that our firm's client
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id. at 230-32.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246-67 (Holmes, J. dissenting and Brandeis, J. dissenting).
Id. at 246 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
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could not link to and display a newspaper's Web site without its
permission. But INS was decided a long time ago. For a significant
period after that case, courts resisted common law intellectual
property because of a general thought that intellectual property was,
in Jefferson's term, "an embarrassment,"' 8 and should be construed
narrowly. That thought was embodied in the 1976 revisions to the
Copyright Act, which contained sweeping preemption language
designed to eliminate any state rights "equivalent" to copyright. 19
Since 1976, however, courts have increasingly been willing to
uphold state laws establishing rights in intangibles against preemption
challenges. In the 1984 case Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,' the Court
decided that research data submitted to a federal agency documenting
the safety of the submitter's product could be considered "property"
within the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'
In the 1987 case Carpenter v. United States,2 the Court treated a
reporter's knowledge of the publication schedule and contents of his
own newspaper column as the "property" of the publisher. 23 Other
examples abound u
B. Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.

In the 1991 Feist case, the Supreme Court denied copyright25
protection to the compilers of a white pages telephone directory.
One might think from the INS case that the Court would have used
similar logic to find a property right for the compilers of the directory.
After all, the production of a white pages directory is a classic "public
goods" problem. But the Court denied the "sweat of the brow" theory
of INS. This may have been due largely because the case was
unavoidably presented as a copyright case and the Court could find no
copyrightable expression. The Court clearly held that facts lie outside
the purview of copyright. 26 For example, "[c]ensus takers . . . do not
18.

See Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and the Jeffersonian Mythology, 29 J. MARSHALL L.

REv. 269, 282, 305 (1995)(stating Jefferson's view that monopolies created by exclusive patents
were an embarrassment)(citing Letter from Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in
WRMNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb, et al. eds., 1903)).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
20.

467 U.S. 986 (1984).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 1003-04.
484 U.S. 19 (1987).
Id. at 25-27.
See supra note 2.
First Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1987).
Id. at 344-45.
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create the population figures that emerge from their efforts."' What
lawyers and courts seem to have read into that decision, however, is
that state law protection for facts might not be preempted by federal
copyright law. 28
So, a perhaps unfortunate consequence of Feist is that a litigant
can argue that section 301 (the preemption section) of the Copyright
Act is exhaustive on the preemption question, and that section 301
says that things outside the scope of copyright are open to state
protection. 29 Then, the argument goes, since facts are outside the
scope of copyright, states can protect facts. Examples include
databases, classified advertising, phone listings, weather satellite
images, and, most recently, sports scores.
C. National Basketball Association v. Sports Team Analysis and
Tracking Systems and National Basketball Association v. Motorola
Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Systems (STATS) sold a
pager system for tracking sports scores. It also made the real-time'
information about NBA basketball games available on a portion of the
America Online dial-up network. The NBA sued in 1996, claiming
several causes of action: copyright infringement, false advertising
under the Federal Lanham Act, and violation of the Communications
Act of 1934.31 The NBA also claimed that the transmissions
constituted commercial misappropriation under New York common
law.' The court denied all the federal law claims, specifically noting
that the scores were not a work of authorship under the Copyright
Act.-4 But the court found the defendants liable on a misappropriation
35
theory based on New York state law.
The court's analysis could be, and was, right out of INS:
"Defendants disseminated to NBA fans game information on a realtime basis. In so doing, they have misappropriated the essence of
27. Id. at 347.
28. See infra Part I.C.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1994).

30. Le., while the event is happening.
31. National Basketball Ass'n v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., 939 F. Supp.

1071, 1088-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), modified sub nom. National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc.,
105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1115.
34. Id. at 1088.
35. Id. at 1114-15.
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NBA's most valuable property-the excitement of an NBA game in
progress. Because defendants have 'reaped where they have not
sown,' NBA is entitled to injunctive relief." 36 On January 30, 1997,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that Motorola and STATS did not unlawfully misappropriate
NBA's property.-'
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the
underlying basketball games are not copyrightable because they "do
not constitute original works of authorship" under the Copyright
Act. 8 In contrast, broadcasts of the games are copyrightable because
the transmission is considered "fixed in [a] tangible medium of
expression."- 9 Here, only the facts from the broadcasts had been
reproduced, not the copyrightable expression of the game that
constitutes the broadcast. 4° Consequently, the court quoted Feist.
"copyright is limited to those aspects of the work-termed
'expression'-that display the stamp of the author's originality."'
Regarding the state law misappropriation claim, the second
circuit said that transmission of the scores did not constitute
misappropriation of "hot news" property that belonged to the NBA."
The court said that the elements of a hot-news misappropriation claim
(the only type of state misappropriation claim the court said would
survive preemption) include:
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the
information is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant's use constitutes freeriding on the plaintiff's efforts; (iv) the defendant is in direct
competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs; and
(v) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of plaintiffs
or others would so reduce the incentive to produce the product
or
43
service so that its existence or quality would be threatened.
I believe this is a newly-articulated test. Although the NBA
planned to go into competition with STATS by providing similar
information via pager, the court determined that because the NBA's
36.
(1918)).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
(1987)).
42.
43.

Id at 1075 (quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239
National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 846 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994)).
d at 847-49.
Id at 847.
Id. at 843 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350
Id
Id. at 845.
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primary business is the game itself (rather than the information
derived from the game), there was no competitive effect in Motorola
because nobody would consider the pager information a substitute for
attending the games or watching them on television.' Also, there was
no free-riding in Motorola because STATS expended its own funds
and manpower to collect the factual information."
So, to sum up, there is a very clear, if not well known, path by
which the owners of information can prevent others from
disseminating it. If the NBA takes the case to the United States
Supreme Court (as it has said it will do), and wins, the doctrine will
clearly extend to the Internet. Where is Feist after this? Are content
owners better off to avoid copyrightable content, on the theory that
they will have greater protection without the creative expression part?

II
The Oxymoron Explosion
This section reviews the events of the recent past relating to the
efforts of the Clinton Administration regarding copyright policy,
principally by former lobbyist Bruce Lehman, currently Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks. I believe that these efforts, unless
checked, will eventually expand the rights of copyright owners in a
manner that is surprising, and ultimately harmful. I call it the
"oxymoron explosion" because the strained and inconsistent rhetoric
of the administration resulted in a proposal that would effectively
remove the copyright law's most fundamental requirement for
infringement: copying. It accomplished this by suggesting a
prohibition, not on copies, but on "transitory" or "ephemeral" copies.
What are ephemeral copies? Well, in my view, they are not copies.
A. The Green Paper and the White Paper
In July 1994 the "Intellectual Property Working Group" of the
"National Information Infrastructure Task Force," appointed by then
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and chaired by Mr. Lehman,
published a draft report on the ways that our laws might be modified
to be more conducive to the development of new communications
technologies. 6 This "Green Paper" was extensively commented on
44.

Id. at 853-54.

45. Id.
46. INFORMATION

INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL

INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
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and somewhat revised, resulting in the publication in September 1995
of "The White Paper."'
Although the administration characterized the White Paper
suggestions as "a minor modification of current law,"' the White
Paper met with severe criticism as a "copyright grab" and a "wholesale
giveaway of the public's rights."' One of the more controversial
recommendations was that the Copyright Act be amended to
specifically state that the right to make a "transmission" of a work is
within the exclusive rights of the copyright owner (whether or not a
copy is made).' The legislative recommendations in the White Paper
were quickly incorporated into bills introduced in the Senate and the
House.5
The reaction from the academic community was very strong. Over
100 law professors, led by James Boyle,5 2 wrote a letter to Vice
President Gore and others protesting the White Paper's
recommendations. The professors' letter stated that "the radical
quality of the White Paper's suggestions"' could be seen from the fact
that they:
(i) would make reading a document on the screen of your Web
browser a copyright violation; (ii) privatize much of the public
domain by overturning the current presumption of fair use ... ;
(iii) make on-line providers . . . strictly liable for violations of
copyright by their members ....
; (iv) [make individuals] civilly
liable for attempting to interfere with any copyright protection
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, (1994)(visited Apr. 5, 1997)<http://palimpsest.stanford.edu/
bytopic/intpropt/ipwg>[hereinafter GREEN PAPER].
47.

INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL

INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:

THE REPORT

OF THE WORKING

GROUP

ON

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995)(visited Apr. 5, 1997)<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc./ipnii>
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
48. Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIREA Jan. 1996 (visited Apr. 5, 1997)<http'./
www.hotwired.com/wired/4.01/features/whitepaper.html>.

49. Id.
50. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 47.
51. H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995)[hereinafter "NII legislation"].
52.

James Boyle is a law professor at American University, who has written a wonderful

book, Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society
(1996), examining the concepts underlying information and property.
53. Open Letter from Professor James Boyle and 106 Professors of Law to Senator Orrin
Hatch, Senator Patrick Leahy, Representative Carlos Moorhead, the Hon. Ron Brown, and Vice
President Al Gore (Feb. 1996), reprinted in James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A
Young Person's Guide, Appendix: The Debate Over the White Paper,10 HARV. J.L. &TECH. 58,
60-65 (1996) [hereinafter "Boyle's Letter"].
54. Id. at 60.
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device or system ...; and (v) Make it a federal crime to remove,
for whatever reason, any of the copyright management information
embedded in any document. 5
Commissioner Lehman responded with a lengthy and heated
letter, stating that far from being a radical measure, the White Paper
takes a "minimalist approach when considering the implications the
Internet will have on intellectual property. "I
Well, who has the better argument? After lengthy consideration, I
am inclined to side with the professors. There is a tendency when
reviewing documents like the White Paper (which runs 250 pages) to
try to list the five or six things that are problematic and tackle them
one by one. But on reflection the real story of the White Paper is that
its proposals are clearly interrelated and the result of one overriding
principle consistently applied: maximization of the rights of
intellectual property owners. One commentator calls this the
"maximalist approach."' Put another way, the presumption of the
White Paper drafters is that the Internet is a huge sieve that will surely
leak away billions of copyright holders' dollars unless each and every
leak is meticulously plugged.
Specifically, the White Paper suggests that its proposal that a
transmission (without any copy being made) be deemed an exclusive58
right of the copyright holder is not any big change from current law.
In fact, Congress's own legislative report on the current copyright
statute gave as an example of a noninfringing reproduction "the
temporary display of images on a screen." The case that the White
Paper uses as the basis for its contention that the law is not radically
changed by the proposal, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,
held that loading operating system software into RAM creates a copy
for copyright purposes.' This approach has, however, only been
adopted in two circuits.
55. Id. at 61.
56. Letter from Bruce A. Lehman, Assitant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of
Patents and Tradmarks, to James Boyle, Professor of Law, Washington School of Law, American
University (Feb. 28, 1996), reprinted in Boyle, supra note 53, at 67 [hereinafter "Lehman's
Response"].
57. Samuelson, supra note 48.
58. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 47, at § IV(A)(1)(a).
59. Letter form Professor James Boyle, Washington School of Law, American University,
to Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks (Apr. 19, 1996), reprinted in Boyle, supra note 53, at 84 (citation omitted)
[hereinafter "Boyle's Response"].
60. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
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The second issue that gives me pause is the White Paper's
treatment of the fair use doctrine.6' The White Paper sets forth what
its drafters purport to be the current state of the law. It is as if the
drafters were saying "if you buy our premise that this is the law, then
these minor changes are all we need." James Boyle calls this a
"destructive reinterpretation."" In any event, a review of the White
Paper's statement of the law of fair use, even over a beer, reveals
denial or worse. For example, the White Paper says that in the Sony
(Betamax) case 63 "the Supreme Court announced a 'presumption' that
helps explain courts' near universal rejection of fair use claims in
commercial contexts." It could be and has been argued that the real
holding in the Betamax case is closer to the idea that all
noncommercial copying is presumptively fair use. 65 Whether you agree
with that or not, the point is that the White Paper does not even
acknowledge this interpretation.
Finally, I am also very skeptical about Commissioner Lehman's
statement that "the goal of the White Paper and the pending
legislation is simply to enable copyright owners to maintain acceptable
levels of control over the uses of their works in the network
environment." The questions are what is an acceptable level of
control and who decides.
B. Database Protection

A separate but related bill proposed by the administration in
early 1996 contained one proposal that was clearly not anticipated by
the White Paper. The bill proposes a sui generis protection of
databases. 67 You will recall from Feist that courts have not been
particularly willing to extend copyright protection to the facts that
comprise most databases, even though they will generally protect the
arrangements of the data as compilations.68 I discussed above the
"misappropriation explosion" that might give some comfort to

61. See generally WHITE PAPER, supra note 46, § I(A)(7)(a).
62. Boyle's Response, supra note 59, at 96.
63. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
64.

WHITE PAPER, supra note 47, at 76.

65. See Samuelson, supra note 48; Boyle's Response, supra note 59.
66. Lehman's Response, supra note 56, at 71.
67. Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531,
104th Cong. (1996)[hereinafter "Database Act of 1996"].

68. See supra Part I.B.
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database owners,' but the administration apparently decided not to
rely on the further development of that law.' ° Instead, it proposed a
system of property rights for such data.'I Such2 systems have previously
been proposed in the European Community.7
The proposed "Database Investment and Intellectual Property
Antipiracy Act of 1996" was aimed at preventing actual or threatened
competitive injury caused by the misappropriation of databases or
their contents. 73 A database would be subject to protection under the
Act if the collection, assembly, verification, organization, or
presentation of the database contents were the result of a
"qualitatively or quantitatively substantial" investment of human,
technical, financial, or other resources. 74 The bill proposed a twentyfive year term of protection. 75 When the bill was introduced, its
sponsors emphasized that the existing protection for databases
afforded by copyright and contract law would not be affected76 The
bill was intended to supplement these legal rights, they said, not
replace them 77 Furthermore, it was emphasized that the bill was
intended to avoid conferring any monopoly on facts. 78 The bill was
supported by database owners such as West Publishing and by the
phone companies, and opposed by research and scientific groups who
noted that the bill contained no exceptions or limitations analogous to
fair use under copyright. 9
C. The "End Run"
For a number of reasons (the Clinton Administration would
contend the Republican controlled Congress presented the most
69. See supra Part I.
70. See generally Database Act of 1996, supra note 67.
71. Id.
72. See Council Directive No. 95/46/ED on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J.
(L281)(issued by the Council of the European Union). See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S
HIGHWAY, THE LAW AND LoRE OF COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX, 214-15
(1994).
73. See Database Act of 1996, supra note 67, § 4.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. § 3(a).
Id. § 6(a).
I& § 9.
Id.
See Database Act of 1996, supra note 67.
See John B. Kennedy & Soshana R. Dweck, WIPO PactsGo Digital: Proposed Treaties

Will Open Up Domestic Debate on Treatment of Electronic Works, 19 NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at

C1.
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significant challenge),, neither the NII legislation nor the database
legislation made it out of committee. Did Commissioner Lehman and
other members of the administration anticipate this? Well, when asked
to comment by a Bureau of National Affairs reporter on what would
happen if the NII bills failed in Congress, Lehman said:
The thing we are going to do is go to Geneva in December. I think
that our proposed statutory changes are very modest. The beauty of
our NII legislation, the White Paper, is that it provides us with a
template for that international system. We are going to see if we
can't negotiate some new international treaties and get that
straightened out. Now it may be that those treaties will require some
legislative implementation. They will certainly have to be ratified by
the Senate in any event, but they also might have to 8be implemented
and that gives us a sort of a second bite of the apple. 0
D. The WIPO Draft and Final Report

So that is what Commissioner Lehman did. The Clinton
Administration proposed, and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (commonly known as "WIPO") accepted for
consideration, a set of draft treaties to be presented to the delegates to
the WIPO conference held in Geneva in December. 8 As Lehman
promised, the proposals closely followed the administration's
"template for the international system."' There were many aspects to
the proposed treaties, including provisions that could impose liability
for copyright infringements to Internet service providers,"' but two
caused the most controversy.
The first is the analog of the transmission right proposed in the
White Paper. The WIPO Draft Copyright Treaty proposed to give
copyright holders the right to prevent any "direct or indirect
reproduction" of a work, "whether permanent or temporary, in any
manner or form."' To make certain that there is no doubt that this
provision is intended to cover transmissions through RAM for the
purpose of viewing a Web page on a screen, the drafters added: "A
80.

Prudence Adler, Nil Copyright Bill Stalled; WIPO Takes Up "DigitalAgenda," ARL: A

BIMONTHLY NEWSLETIER OF RESEARCH LIBRARY ISSUES AND ACTIONS,

Aug. 1996, at 187 (visited

Apr. 4, 1997)<http://arl.cni.org/newsltr/187/bill.html>.
81. See generally Draft Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works (1996)(visited Apr. 5, 1997)<http://www.loc.gov/copyright/wipo4.html>
[hereinafter "WIPO Draft Copyright Treaty"].
82. Adler, supra note 80; see also WIPO Draft Copyright Treaty, supra note 81.
83. See, e.g., WIPO Draft Copyright Treaty, supra note 81, art. 13.
84. Id.art.7, 1.
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work that is stored for a very short time may be reproduced or
communicated further, or it may be made perceptible by an
appropriate device."5 As in the White Paper, the drafters are very
careful to state that they believe that the proposed article does not
really expand existing law, stating that "[t]he scope of the right of
reproduction is already broad." According to the explanatory notes
for the draft treaty, all the drafters are doing is87 making "explicit" the
"inclusion of direct and indirect reproduction."
The second proposal was a sui generis database protection
treaty. 8 The draft provided that treaty signatory countries "shall
protect any database that represents a substantial investment in the
collection, assembly, verification, organization or presentation of the
contents of the database."'
To make a huge understatement, there was a lot of opposition.g°
One has only to visit the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) site
or the essential.org 9' threads on these topics to sense the degree of
outrage. People flew to Geneva, they camped out, they posted to the
Web. The going was tough. One correspondent wrote that "you could
not imagine a more closed proceeding."' At the end of the dayDecember 20, 1996, to be exact-both of these provisions failed to be
adopted. The database provision was an early casualty. According to
the WIPO press release,' the Conference did not discuss it, but rather
adopted a recommendation to convene an extraordinary session of the
WIPO governing bodies to decide on the further preparatory work
required for database protection. 9' The "ephemeral copying"
provision was dropped at the last minute. The official WIPO press
release stated that the Conference considered the transitory copies
85. Id. Notes on Art. 7, Note 7.05.
86. Id. Notes on Art. 7, Note 7.01.
87. Id. Notes on Art. 7, Note 7.04.
88. Draft Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases (1996)(visited Apr.
5, 1997)<http://www.wipo.org/eng/dipconf/6dcsta.htm>[hereinafter "WIPO Draft Database
Treaty"].
89. Id. art. 1.

90. See, e.g., <http://www.eff.orgintelectual.property/efLwip-19961122.comments>(visited
Apr. 5, 1997)(discussing EFF's concerns with the database proposal).
91.

See generally (visited Apr. 5, 1997)<http://essential.org>; see also (visited Apr. 5, 1997)

<http://www.publicdomain.org/copyright/signan.html>.
92. Comments from discussion thread on http://essential.org.
93. See WIPO Press Release No. 106, Dec. 20, 1996 (visted Apr. 5, 1997)<http://www.wipo.
orglorg/diplcanf/distrib/pressl06.htm>.
94.

Id.
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issue, "but did not adopt any such provisions since it considered that
these issues may be appropriately handled on the basis of existing
international norms on the right of reproduction." 95
Conclusion
The foregoing is intended to be a short survey of a complicated
situation, both regarding the "misappropriation explosion" and the
administration's attempts to protect rights holders. As I mentioned,
the Second Circuit's decision in NBA may mark some pulling back
from the "misappropriation explosion," or it may be reversed by the
Supreme Court. If it stands, I think it has to be seen as inconsistent
with the holding in the INS case and as a challenge to rights holders,
particularly organizations that produce "hot news." There is currently
no intention to introduce additional NII legislation, 96 but I am sure we
will hear more on this subject.
I think there are several challenges ahead as the law addresses the
unique circumstances of the Internet. First, I think there is a real need
to give some clear protection to the content of databases. The new
digital technologies and cross-enterprise networks have combined to
produce the greatest changes in the way information is distributed
since the invention of the printing press. The use of computers has
made it economically feasible to collect, store, manage, and deliver
huge amounts of data at a time when continuously expanding
databases have become the building blocks of knowledge, especially,
as Professor Pam Samuelson 97 notes, in the observational sciences.
When used with the power of a computer and useful manipulation
applications, databases allow us to make sense out of what in all
previous centuries would have been seen as a mass of unrelated,
incomprehensible facts.
Not only does this technology make databases more important, it
also exacerbates the problem of the public goods nature of databases.
They are still expensive to produce, but now the copying, use, and
general free riding has become even easier, cheaper, and faster. I think
there is a very real chance that absent some protective laws, with
appropriate public domain safeguards analogous to "fair use" under
95. Id.
96. Telephone Interview, Patent and Trademark Office (Jan. 31, 1997).
97. Ms. Samuelson is a law professor at University of California Berkeley, Boalt Hall
School of Law. See supranotes 4 and 48.
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copyright, we will end up with some significant underinvestment in
these new, very helpful creations.
Second, I believe we have to articulate a rationale for the
protection of facts, such as sports scores, that are not part of
databases. As I said above, the Feist decision has had the unfortunate
effect of reinvigorating a common law jurisprudence, whether called
"misappropriation" or "conversion" or otherwise, that is effectively
the "common law copyright" that Congress, correctly, in my view,
tried to eliminate in the preemption provisions of the 1976 Copyright
Act. I am not saying this because I think federal judges are more
capable of interpreting intellectual property law than state court
judges, or that intellectual property law is so important in the world
economy that we must have a uniform approach across the country. I
think it is important that we have debate on this subject, informed by
as good an understanding as is possible of the consequences. We
should acknowledge that technology changes every day but also that
ignoring these issues is not going to make them go away. In other
words, whether one feels that the "public goods" problem requires the
commodification of information in order to avoid underproduction, or
that these are unnecessary legal monopolies in which transactions
costs are introduced into the free flow of information, Congress ought
to be able to articulate some standard by which courts can make these
decisions.
Professor James Boyle says that one of the reasons we have
trouble protecting facts is that they do not conform to our romantic
and heroic ideals of the author laboring away in the garret. 99 I think
there is something to that. "Mere facts" are somehow "lesser
creatures." Presented with this rare opportunity to balance new
property rights with the benefits of easy access to information, I think
courts, government officials, and legislators should proceed carefully.

98. Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, unpublished works were protected by state common
law copyright. See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT §§ 15.4-15.6 (1989). See e.g., King v. Mister
Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)(common law copyright in Dr. Martin
Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech); Krahmer v. Luing, 317 A.2d 96, (N.J. Super. 1974)
(1974)(common law copyright in architect's unpublished plans, even though building was
completed). Under section 301 of the 1976 Act, common law copyright protection has been
significantly limited, and now applies only where the work does not fall within the subject matter
of copyright under the 1976 Act or if the work is not fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 17
U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
99. See generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SociETY (1996).
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